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DOLAN v. CITY OF TIGARD: JUDICIAL
PANACEA TO THE TAKINGS CLAUSE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Local governments, faced with shrinking budgets and a public op-
posed to higher taxes, have increasingly turned to developers for exac-
tions to support development. These exactions have supplied the
financial answer for many public services. Developers have generally
viewed these exactions as a cost of doing business. However, develop-
ers also realize that the denial of a permit could mean the end of their
project. The result of these exactions, apart from new streets, street
lights, and parks, has been the shifting of the government's responsi-
bility to provide for these things onto private developers.
Under previous law, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
was basically a non-factor as virtually any land-use exaction could pass
muster. In Dolan v. City of Tigard,' the United States Supreme Court
announced a new federal takings standard. This new standard, which
the Court termed "rough proportionality," requires that exactions
must be in rough proportionality to the impact of the proposed devel-
opment. Thus, the message of the Dolan decision is clear. From now
on, exactions, particularly ones which require land dedication, must
clearly solve the problems generated by the landowner upon whom
they are levied. Additionally, these exactions must be in proportion
to the impact the proposed development is likely to have. The Court's
decision has ended the days when a city could determine that con-
structing a new golf course creates a need for low income housing,
then condition the building permit on the developer contributing to
the construction of such housing.
In addition to developing the "rough proportionality" test, the
Court did something else in the process. The Court elevated the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment from the status of "poor rela-
tion" in the Bill of Rights.' As a result of this holding, property
owners are now given the same measure of protection given under the
First Amendment.
1. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
2. I& at 2320.
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II. REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW PRIOR DOLAN
Any discussion of what constitutes a taking begins with the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 The Federal govern-
ment is bound by the Fifth Amendment and cannot take private prop-
erty without paying just compensation for it. Although some have
argued otherwise,4 the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prevent state governments from
taking private property without paying just compensation as well.'
Problems arise, however, when one tries to determine whether
certain government regulations constitute a taking. The Supreme
Court first addressed this question early in this century in Penn-
sylvania Coal v. Mahon.6 In that case Justice Holmes pronounced
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'7 The Court then, how-
ever, took a 56 year break from addressing the issue.
In 1978 the Court picked up where it left off 56 years earlier. In
deciding Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,8 the Court
recognized that they had not yet developed a "set formula" to aid in
determining what constituted a taking.9 The Court then analyzed the
several cases it had decided and constructed a three tiered test to de-
termine whether a given regulation equaled a taking.'0 The Penn Cen-
tral Court examined "[1] the economic impact of the regulation,... [2]
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations,... [and 3] the character of the govern-
mental action.""
Two years later the Court developed another test, further refining
the test developed in Penn Central. In Agins v. City of Tiburon,'2 the
Court stated that a government regulation effects a taking when it
3. The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken without just
compensation. U.S. CONs-r. amend. V.
4. Generally, the Fifth Amendment has been applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
5. DeSalvo v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 239 F. Supp. 312,316 (E.D. Ark. 1965); 20th Century
Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 878 P.2d 566, 614 (Cal. 1994); Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. County
of San Joaquin, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37, 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
6. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
7. lId at 415.
8. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
9. Id. at 124.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
[Vol. 31:181
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"does not substantially advance legitimate state interests,... or de-
nies an owner economically viable use of his land.' 3
Most of the cases following Agins applied or used only one of
these two aforementioned tests. In doing so, these cases added to and
further developed the takings doctrine. Prior to Dolan, the Supreme
Court avoided developing a standard test for determining when a reg-
ulation equaled a taking. Rather, the Court usually decided these is-
sues on a case by case basis.14 The Court has stated:
our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining
what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest' or what type of connec-
tion between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the re-
quirement that the former 'substantially advance' the latter. They
have made clear, however, that a broad range of governmental pur-
poses and regulations satisfies these requirements. 15
The rest of this section examines four areas in which the Court has
established guidelines as to whether a given regulation equals a tak-
ing. These four types of regulatory takings can be classified as: (a)
physical occupation; (b) noxious harm; (c) deprivation of economic
use; and (d) development exactions.
A. Physical Occupation or Use
If a government makes or authorizes a permanent physical occu-
pation of property, this occupation will be found to constitute a tak-
ing. This is so no matter how small the interference is and no matter
how significant the government interest niay be. The main case in this
area is Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.6
In Loretto, Jean Loretto purchased an apartment building. 7 The
previous owner had given Teleprompter permission to install cables
and cable boxes on the roof of the building.' 8 Furthermore, a New
York statute allowed cable companies to install cable equipment on
buildings, provided they pay the landowner a one-time reasonable
fee.' 9 The legislature had set this fee at one dollar, unless the land-
owner could demonstrate greater damage. 20 Loretto brought a class
13. Id. at 260 (citation omitted).
14. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437,441 n.7 (Or. 1993) (quoting Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992)).
15. Nolan v. California Coastal Conn'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987).
16. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
17. Id. at 421.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 423.
20. Id. at 424.
1995]
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action suit alleging the cable companies' actions were a trespass, and
that the New York statute constituted a taking without just
compensation.21
The Supreme Court held that a taking occurs when there is a per-
manent physical occupation authorized by the government. 22 This is
so, the Court held, regardless of the public interest the occupation
may serve.23 The Court further held that Constitutional protection for
private property rights cannot be made to depend on the size of the
area permanently occupiedA Thus, any permanent, physical invasion
of property, no matter how large or small, will give rise to a taking.25
B. Total Deprivation of All Economically Viable Use of Land
The Supreme Court has established a flat rule that a taking oc-
curs when a regulation denies an owner of "all economically beneficial
use of his land."26 A recent case following this rule is Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.27
Lucas paid close to one million dollars for two tracts of land on a
barrier island in South Carolina.28 At the time of the purchase a prop-
erty owner was allowed to, and Lucas planned on, building houses on
such lots. 29 South Carolina, in order to protect its coastline from ero-
sion, enacted the Beachfront Management Act, which barred property
owners in a critical area from building any structure.30 The lots Lucas
had purchased were located in a critical area, and he was therefore
prevented from going forward with his construction plans.31
Justice Scalia held a total denial of all use of one's land is a taking
even if the purpose of the regulation is to prevent a harm rather than
confer a public benefit. 2 The Court then remanded the case to the
state court to determine whether Lucas had indeed been deprived of
all economically viable use of his land.33
21. Id.
22. Ik at 426.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id
26. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, § 2.07 (3d ed. 1993).
27. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
28. I1. at 2889.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. I1&
32. Id. at 2899.
33. Id. at 2901-02.
[Vol. 31:181
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C. Prevention of Harm or Noxious Use
A regulation rather than a taking is likely to occur when a gov-
ernment prevents property use which is harmful or noxious to
others.' Hadacheck v. Sebastian35 typifies such a "noxious use" de-
termination. Hadacheck challenged the validity of a Los Angeles or-
dinance that made it unlawful to operate a brickyard or brick kiln
within certain areas of the city.36 Hadacheck's land, purchased before
the ordinance was passed, was worth about $800,000 as a brickyard
and about $60,000 when used for any other purpose.37 When
Hadacheck bought the land it was isolated outside of the Los Angeles
city limits.38
The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance under the Fourteenth
Amendment as a reasonable exercise of the police power.39 In doing
so the Court held that a city may, under its police power, prohibit
certain land use if such prohibition promotes the health, safety, and
general welfare of the public.40 This police power was validly exer-
cised even though the prohibition detrimentally affected the value of
Hadacheck's land.41 The Court agreed with the California Supreme
Court that the Hadachecks could not avoid compliance with the ordi-
nance because the property had not initially fallen within the city lim-
its.42 "To so hold would preclude development and fix a city forever
in its primitive conditions. There must be progress, and if in its march
private interests are in the way, they must yield to the good of the
community. '43
D. Development Exactions
The most recent area of takings doctrine the Court has examined
involves exactions.44 Development exactions occur when a city de-
mands, as a condition for receiving a building permit, that a developer
34. See generally Bruce W. Burton, Regulatory Takings and the Shape of Things to Come:
Harbingers of a Takings Clause Reconstellation, 72 OR. L. Rnv. 603 (1993) (discussing the evolu-
tion of judicial interpretation of the Takings Clause).
35. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
36. d at 396, 404.
37. Id at 405.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 410-14.
40. Id. at 410-11.
41. Id. at 408.
42. Id. at 410.
43. Id.
44. For a complete overview of additional areas and cases the Court has decided concerning
takings, see MANDELKER, supra note 26.
1995]
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"give" something to the city or locality.45 In most cases, the "gift" is a
land dedication or a financial contribution, most commonly known as
an impact or development fee.46 However, municipalities sometimes
require the landowner's gift consist of an agreement that limits the use
of the landowner's land.47
Prior to Dolan, the leading case in this area was Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Comm'n.4s In Nollan, the land use regulation at issue pre-
vented the Nollans from rebuilding a house on their beachfront
property unless they first gave a public easement across the part of
their property adjacent to the ocean.4 9 The California Coastal Com-
mission required the access dedication because the new house would
block the view of the ocean from the street running in front of the
Nollan's property.5 0 Additionally, the Commission believed the house
would prevent public beachgoers from walking along the beach while,
in the process, it would increase the private landowner's use of the
beachfront.51 Finally, the Commission held that building the new
house would block the public's view of the beach and prevent the pub-
lic from realizing a stretch of coastline open to the public existed
nearby.52
The Court held this condition constituted a taking of property.
5 3
In doing so the Court stated the taking of a permanent, public-access
easement without compensation violates the Takings Clause.54 The
Court then decided if its above stated holding should change when the
municipality demands an easement in exchange for a land-use per-
mit.5 5 The Court held conditioning the Nollans' building permit on
their granting an easement would be lawful if doing so "substantially
advance[s] legitimate state interests" and "does not 'den[y] an owner
economically viable use of his land.' 56 Thus the Court reaffirmed the
45. Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "'Take' my Beach, Pleasel": Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B.U. L.
REv. 823, 823 (1989).
46. IL See also ALAN A. ALTSHiuL-R & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEz, ROuLAION FOR REVE-
NUE 3 (1993).
47. Id.
48. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
49. Id. at 828.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 829.
52. Id. at 828.
53. Id. at 841-42.
54. Id. at 831.
55. Id. at 834.
56. Id. (quoting Agins v. City of 'liburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (alteration in original).
[V7ol. 31:181
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two part test derived from Agins v. City of Tiburon." The Court,
however, then extended Agins and determined what standards are to
be used in determining when a regulation substantially advances a le-
gitimate state interest. The Court stated:
our opinions do not establish that these standards are the same as
those applied to due process or equal protection claims. To the con-
trary, our verbal formulations in the takings field have generally
been quite different. We have required that the regulation 'substan-
tially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved,
.. not that 'the State 'could rationally have decided' that the mea-
sure adopted might achieve the State's objective.'5 8
This holding modified previous takings doctrine in that courts
now had to apply a heightened standard of judicial review when con-
sidering whether government interests are advanced by a land use reg-
ulation. The Court did not state how closely the imposed condition
should meet the state's objective because in Nollan the nexus between
the exaction and the condition imposed did not meet the loosest stan-
dard.5 9 Thus the Court left for a different case the issue of what the
required "fit" between the condition and the burden required must
be. That next case just happened to be Dolan.
11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Statement of the Facts
In 1973, the State of Oregon passed a statute requiring cities to
adopt extensive land use plans which complied with statewide land
use goals.6" The city of Tigard thereafter adopted a comprehensive
57. Id.
58. ld. at 835 n.3 (quoting Agins v. liburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) and Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)).
59. Id. at 838.
60. Op. REv. STAT. §§ 197.005-197.860 (1991). The substance of section 197.005, entitled
General Provisions-Legislative findings, is as follows:
The Legislative Assembly finds that:
(1) Uncoordinated use of lands within this state threaten the orderly development, the
environment of this state and the health, safety, order, convenience, prosperity and
welfare of the people of this state.
(2) To promote coordinated administration of land uses consistent with comprehensive
plans adopted throughout the state, it is necessary to establish a process for the review
of state agency, city, county and special district land conservation and development
plans for compliance with goals.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of this section, cities and counties
should remain as the agencies to consider, promote and manage the local aspects of
land conservation and development for the best interests of the people within their
jurisdictions.
(4) The promotion of coordinated statewide land conservation and development re-
quires the creation of a statewide planning agency to prescribe planning goals and
1995]
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land use plan.61 This extensive plan was codified in Tigard's Commu-
nity Development Code ("CDC"). 62 The CDC set forth various re-
strictions and requirements for property owners whose property was
located within the Central Business District ("CBD").63 The CDC
limited the amount of land which could be built upon to 85% of the
total area of a given plot, thus requiring a landowner to keep 15%
clear of all structures. This requirement limited total coverage of the
site, including all buildings and paved parking, to 85 percent of the
tract of land.64 Furthermore, after a study showed the CBD had a
traffic problem, the city decided to build a bike path in the hopes of
alleviating some of the congestion. 65 This bike path was to designed
to encourage the use of alternative means of transportation.66  The
objectives to be applied by state agencies, cities, counties and special districts through-
out the state.
(5) City and county governments are responsible for the development of local compre-
hensive plans. The purpose of OAS 195.065 to 195.075 and 197.185 is to enhance coor-
dination among cities, counties, and special districts to assure effectiveness and
efficiency in the delivery of urban services required under those local comprehensive
plans.
61. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2313 (1994). The two most important land use
goals, for purposes of the Dolan decision are: Land Use Goal Number 5 and Land Use Goal
Number 12. The purposes of goal number 5 are to conserve open space and protect natural and
scenic resources. This goal defines "Open Space" as consisting of land
used for agriculture or forest uses, and any land area that would if preserved and con-
tinued in its present use: (a) Conserve and enhance natural or scenic resources; (b)
Protect air or streams or water supply; (c) Promote conservation of soils, wetlands,
beaches or tidal marshes; (d) Conserve landscaped areas, such as public or private golf
courses, that reduce air pollution and enhance the value of abutting or neighboring
property; (e) Enhance the value to the public of abutting or neighboring parks, forests,
wildlife preserves, nature reservations or sanctuaries or other open space; (f) Enhance
recreation opportunities; (g) Preserve historic sites; (h) Promote orderly urban
development.
OR ADMn R. 660-15-000 (5) (1975).
Interestingly, subsection B, entitled Implementation, of this goal provides that: "(7) Local,
regional, and state governments should be encouraged to investigate and utilize fee acquisition,
easements, cluster developments, preferential assessment, development rights acquisition and
similar techniques to implement this goal." Id. (emphasis added). The city of Tigard did not
attempt to use any of the methods listed that involved compensating the Dolan's in some man-
ner. Land Use Goal number 12 involves transportation and was the stimulus for the city of
Tigard's bicycle/pedestrian pathway. The goal is set out as follows:
The purpose of Goal 12 is: [t]o provide and encourage a safe, convenient and economic
transportation system. A transportation plan shall (1) consider all modes of transporta-
tion including mass transit, air, water, pipeline, rail, highway, bicycle and pedestrian; (2)
be based upon an inventory of local, regional and state transportation needs... (9)
conform with local and regional comprehensive land use plans.
OR ADmiN. R. 660-15-000 (12) (1975).
62. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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CDC stated the developers were going to help construct these bike
paths by requiring them to dedicate the land needed for the paths.67
Additionally, Tigard had adopted a Master Drainage Plan.68 This
plan indicated that flooding often occurred along Fanno Creek, near
the Dolans' property.69 Concerned that further development would
increase the amount of water runoff, the city included a number of
recommendations designed to combat the runoff in the Master Drain-
age Plan.70 Among these recommendations was one ensuring the
floodplain surrounding the development remain as greenways free
from any sort of development.71
John and Florence Dolan owned 1.67 acres of land located within
the CBD72 of Tigard,73 on which they owned and operated a plumbing
and electrical supply store.74 The Dolans applied to the city of Tigard
67. CDC, § 18.86.040.A.l.b provides: "The development shall facilitate pedestrian/bicycle
circulation if the site is located on a street with designated bikepaths or adjacent to a designated
greenway/open space/park .... " Id., reprinted in Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313 n.1. Furthermore,
§ 18.120.180.A.8 provides:
[w]here landfill and/or development is allowed within and adjacent to the 100-year
floodplain, the city shall require the dedication of sufficient open land area for green-
way adjoining and within the floodplain. This area shall include portions at a suitable
elevation for the construction of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway within the floodplain in
accordance with the adopted pedestrian/bicycle plan.
Id., reprinted in Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
68. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
69. Id
The major drainage problem in Tigard is the storm water runoff throughout the area.
This problem results from the increase in impervious land surfaces that can alter the
quantity and quality of runoff from the land. Much of the deficiencies that currently
exist within the Tigard area are due to the lack of adequate storm drainage facilities in
many areas and stream bank overflow along the Fanno Creek Basin.
City of Tigard's Comprehensive Storm Drainage and Wastewater Management, § 1-192(111), re-
printed in Brief for the Respondent, Appendix A at la-2a , Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct.
2309 (1994) (No. 93-518).
70. Id
For example it is stated that numerous bridges, i.e. the Tigard Street and North Dakota
Street bridges, are currently below flood elevation and these bridges substantially de-
crease the flow of water along Fanno Creek. It is suggested in the study that raising the
bridge deck would alleviate much requirements and costs for development of an effec-
tive drainage management system.
City of Tigard's Comprehensive Storm Drainage and Wastewater Management, § 1-192(111), re-
printed in Brief for the Respondent, Appendix A at 2a, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994) (No. 93-518).
71. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
72. Permitted uses of property within the Central Business District include eating and
drinking establishments, community recreation and various other uses. CDC, § 18.66.030, re-
printed in Brief for the Respondent, Appendix B at 12b-14b, Dolan v. City of 'igard, 114 S. Ct.
2309 (1994) (No. 93-518). The Dolan's retail store qualified as a "permitted" use within the
Central Business District. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 438 (Or. 1993).
73. Id. Mr. Dolan has since died and his widow carried the case to the Supreme Court.
74. Id.
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for a permit to remove their existing 9,700 square foot store.75 In its
place they planned to build a new 17,600 square foot store and to
expand their parking lot.76 The Dolans eventually planned to provide
even more parking space as well as build a strip mall on their land.77
The city conditionally granted the Dolans' application provided they
surrender part of their land located in the floodplain for future devel-
opment of the storm drainage system.78 In addition to the floodplain
grant, Tigard further required the Dolans to dedicate a 15 foot strip of
land to be used for the bike path.79 Thus, in order for the Dolans to
obtain their building permit they were required to give Tigard 7000
square feet of land or roughly 10% of their property.80
B. Procedure and Lower Court Decisions
The Dolans requested a variance from these conditions, which
the City Planning Commission denied.8 1 In denying the Dolans' vari-
ance request, the Planning Commission found the required relation-
ship existed between the condition imposed by the city and the impact
of the Dolans' proposed development.82 In supporting the bicycle
path dedication, the Commission stated that employers and customers
of the Dolans' store might use the bike path. 3 The Commission then
stated that use of the bike path by patrons of the Dolans could offset
some of the increased traffic created by the larger store.84 Further-
more, the Commission found the condition requiring the Dolans to
dedicate part of their land to be reasonably related to the impact their
increased development would have on the surrounding area. 5
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 439.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 439 n.3.:
[The c]ity's decision includes the following relevant conditions: '1. The applicant shall
dedicate to the City as Greenway all portions of the site that fall within the existing
100-year floodplain [of Fanno Creek] ... and all property 15 feet above (to the east of)
the 150.0 foot floodplain boundary. The building shall be designed so as not to intrude
into the greenway area.'
Id.
81. Id. at 439.
82. Id.
83. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853, 855 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
84. Id.
85. Id.
[V¢ol. 31:181
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The Dolans appealed the decision of the Planning Commission to
the Land Use Board of Appeals, (LUBA).86 In upholding the dedica-
tion requirements, LUBA also found Tigard's demands to be "reason-
ably related" to the impacts the new development would create. 7 In
dealing with the bike path, the Board again found a "reasonable rela-
tionship between reducing the increased traffic caused by the develop-
ment and implementing the bicycle path as an alternative means of
transportation." '
Likewise, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed LUBA's deci-
sion. In doing so, they rejected the Dolans' contention the conditions
be examined using the more stringent "essential nexus" test rather
than the lower threshold "reasonable relationship" test.8 9
On review, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of
LUBA and the Oregon Court of Appeals." The Oregon Supreme
Court stated the city's dedication requirements were not a taking be-
cause the impacts from the Dolans' new, larger store were reasonably
related to the requirement that the Dolans dedicate their land for a
bicycle path and greenway.91 The court rejected the Dolans' conten-
tion that the "cause and effect" relationship or "essential nexus" of
Nollan required it to use heightened scrutiny subject in evaluating the
city's decision.9
V. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. Dolan Decision Limited to Exactions, not Regulation
Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion for a 5-4 majority, be-
gan the Dolan opinion much the same way the Nollan opinion was
written.93 Framing the dilemma before the Court, Rehnquist began
by making an argument for the Dolans: "[H]ad the city simply re-
quired petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for
86. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Dolan v. City of ligard, 832 P.2d 853, 855 (Or. C. App. 1994).
90. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 444 (Or. 1993).
91. Id. at 443.
92. Id.
93. Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2316. Rehnquist begins the opinion by firmly asserting this case is
rooted in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stevens, in dissent, argues that the case is actually grounded in
the substantive Due Process clause. Id. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This is an important
distinction because the "essential nexus" under Justice Stevens' approach has a much lower
threshold than the newly created "rough proportionality" standard Rehnquist develops.
1995]
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public use, rather than conditioning the grant of her permit to rede-
velop her property on such a dedication, a taking would have oc-
curred."94 "Such public access would deprive petitioner of the right to
exclude others, 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property."'95
Rehnquist then proffered an argument for the city of Tigard. 6
He stated land use planning had been upheld as constitutional, 97 that
government could hardly function if it had to pay for every diminution
in the value of property,98 and that the regulation of land use would
not be a taking if it "substantially advance[d] legitimate state inter-
ests" and did not "den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
land."99The majority rejected this analysis as the cases on which it was
based were regulatory cases and Dolan was an exaction case. These
regulatory cases differed from Dolan, the Court stated, for two rea-
sons. First, the regulatory opinions were government decisions which
classified large areas of the city, whereas here Tigard had made an
adjudicative decision which conditioned approval of the Dolan's
building permit on a single tract of land. 00 Second, the conditions
demanded by Tigard were not simply land-use restrictions, but a re-
quirement that the Dolans deed part of their land to the city.10 1
The ability of a city to zone or regulate land is not threatened by
the Dolan decision.102 The Court merely eliminated an exaction
which catered to the wishes of the city rather than address the
problems created by the proposed development.0 3 The Court's limi-
tation of its opinion to exactions becomes more apparent when the
majority, in dicta, states that land use regulation generally did not
trouble them.104 What troubled the majority was not the regulation
but the requirement that the Dolans deed a portion of their property
to the city. Had Tigard merely demanded the Dolans not build in the
94. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 438 U.S. 825,
831 (1987)).
95. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
98. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
99. Id. (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (alteration in original).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Eric Damian Kelly, Supreme Court Strikes Middle Ground on Exactions Test, LAND USE
L. & ZONING DIG., July 1994, at 6,7.
103. Id.
104. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317-18, 2320.
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floodplain, the majority would not have struck the regulation. How-
ever, the Court felt Tigard's demands for the Dolans' property along
Fanno Creek went too far. 05
Additional elements limiting the Court's holding to land dedica-
tion exaction cases are found in the majority opinion. Many of the
state court decisions used by the majority are not zoning cases, rather
they are land dedication cases.0 6 Furthermore, the majority is consis-
tent with its terminology, always referring to the "proposed dedica-
tion" or "proposed exaction" rather than the "proposed
regulation."'1 07
B. The Dolan Two Step Test
1. Essential Nexus
In evaluating the Dolans' claim, the majority developed a test to
determine whether the exaction in question amounted to an uncom-
pensated taking. Relying on the test developed in Nollan, the major-
ity began by stating the first part of the test involved determining
"whether the 'essential nexus' exists between the 'legitimate state in-
terest' and the permit condition exacted by the city."'1 8 Thus, in order
to satisfy the first part of the test two elements must be present. There
must be a legitimate state interest and there must be an essential
nexus between that legitimate state interest and the permit condition
exacted by the city.
2. "Rough Proportionality"
If the Court finds a nexus exists, it "must then decide the required
degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact
of the proposed development."' 0 9 This constitutes the second part of
the Dolan test. The Court did not have to answer this question in
Nollan because the Court held the "connection" in that case "did not
105. "The city has never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was re-
quired in the interest of flood control." "The difference to petitioner... is the loss of her ability
to exclude others... [and] [als we have noted, this right to exclude others is 'one of the essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."' Id. (quoting Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 167, 176 (1979)).
106. David Callies, Nexus Redux on Required Land Dedications, LAND USE L. & ZONING
Di., July 1994, at 3,4.
107. Id.; see also Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309.
108. Dolan, 114 S. Ct at 2317. Some have commented that the Dolan test can be seen as a
three part test. Callies, supra note 106.
109. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
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meet even the loosest standard." 110 As the situation in Dolan was dif-
ferent, the Court had to break new ground and develop a standard by
which courts could measure the connection required. Since the Court
was charting new waters, they deferred to state court decisions in this
area because they had been addressing this issue longer than the
Supreme Court had."1
Some states utilize a relaxed standard for the connection needed
between the required dedication and the planned development. 112
The majority quickly disposed of this standard claiming it would not
sufficiently protect the Dolans' right to be compensated if their prop-
erty was unjustly taken.113
Other state courts had adopted a strict standard, called the "spe-
cific and uniquely attributable" test.114 This test required the local
government demonstrate that its requested exaction was proportional
to the need created by the development." 5 If the exaction was not
proportional it then "[became] a veiled exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain and a confiscation of private property behind the defense
of police regulations."" 6 The majority did not think the Constitution
"require[d] such exacting scrutiny."1 7
Finally, the majority settled on a standard. The majority selected
a middle ground approach, adopted by many state courts, which re-
quired a "municipality to show a reasonable relationship between the
required dedication and the impact the proposed development cre-
ates." ' s While this test had been adopted in many jurisdictions, and
is referred by various names, "general agreement exists among the
courts that the dedication should have some reasonable relationship
110. Id. (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 438 U.S. 825, 838 (1987)).
111. Id. at 2318.
112. Id. (citing Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964);
Jenad Inc, v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966)).
113. Id at 2319.
114. Id. (quoting Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Il1.
1961)).
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Il.
1961)).
117. Id.
118. Id. The majority cites Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980), as a repre-
sentative opinion. That court stated: "The distinction, therefore, which must be made between
an appropriate exercise of the police power and an improper exercise of eminent domain is
whether the requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which the
property is being made or is merely being used as an excuse for taking property simply because
at that particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some license or permit." Simpson,
292 N.W.2d at 301.
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to the needs created by the [development]."" 9 The majority decided
that this test was the most constitutional option.120
The majority did not adopt the test verbatim from the state court
decisions. Deeming the term "reasonable relationship" too similar to
the term "rational basis", the majority renamed the test, instead call-
ing it the "rough proportionality" test. 2' The majority felt this term
best expressed what they felt the Fifth Amendment required. 22 The
test developed by the majority does not require pin-point precision;
however, the municipality must attempt to determine on a case-by-
case basis the required land dedication is related to the impact of the
planned development.'23
C. Shifting the Burden of Proof
In holding the city must make some sort of individual determina-
tion that the required land dedication is related to the impact of the
planned development, the majority shifted the burden of justifying the
dedication to the city.' 24 In his dissent Justice Stevens argued, and the
majority admitted, when zoning regulations are scrutinized, the bur-
den of justifying the regulations rests on the challenging party. 25 Ad-
ditionally, Justice Stevens argued, zoning regulations are strongly
presumed to be valid under the Constitution. 26
The majority distinguished Dolan from a zoning regulation case.
Here, Tigard demanded from the Dolans part of their land as a condi-
tion of using the rest of the parcel. In such a case, it is not Dolan who
bears the burden of proving a lack of relationship between the re-
quired conditions and the effect of planned development; rather, the
city of Tigard must quantify the connection between the required ex-
actions and the effect of the planned development.2 7
119. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319 (quoting Call v. West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979)). See,
e.g., Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965); Collis v. Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d
19 (Minn. 1976); College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984). See generally
Morosoff, supra note 45; See also Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983).
120. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
121. Id. The significance of renaming the test was alluded to earlier in footnote one, supra.
Under the Equal Protection/ substantive due process clause the test utilized is the rational basis
test. This test involves a minimal level of scrutiny in determining whether there is the required
relationship between the dedication and the needs created by the development.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2319-20.
124. Id. at 2320 n.8.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2325 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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VI. THE DECISION
In the Dolan decision, the majority held the city of Tigard had not
met its burden of proving that the connection between the exactions
demanded and the effect of planned development were roughly
proportional.128
The majority had little problem determining there were legiti-
mate state interests involved in this case: "[t]he prevention of flood-
ing along Fanno Creek and the reduction of traffic congestion in the
Central Business District qualify as the type of legitimate public pur-
poses we have upheld."' 29
Likewise, the majority easily found the required nexus between
Tigard's desire to prevent flooding near the Dolans' property and
Tigard's requirement that the Dolans keep the floodplain free from
development.130 The Dolans planned to increase the size of their
store and parking lot, in the process enlarging the amount of impervi-
ous surfaces on the property.' 3 ' This increase of impervious surfaces
would lead to less absorption by the surrounding floodplain and an
increase in the amount of runoff which would enter Fanno Creek. 32
The majority also found the required nexus between Tigard's attempt
to lessen traffic and their providing the bike path as an alternative to
automobile transportation: "[i]n theory, a pedestrian/bicycle pathway
provides a useful alterative means of transportation for workers and
shoppers."' 33
It was when the majority applied the rough proportionality test
the city of Tigard failed to meet its burden of proof. The majority
axiomatically accepted the contention that the increased amount of
impervious surfaces created by the new development would increase
the amount storm-water flow from the Dolan's property.134 Addition-
ally, the majority agreed keeping the floodplain clear and free of de-
velopment would probably limit the increased strains created by the
new development. 35 However, the city of Tigard not only wanted to
prevent development in the floodplain, it wanted the Dolans to give
the city part of their land.' 36 "The city has never said why a public
128. Id. at 2321.
129. Id. at 2317-18.
130. Id. at 2318.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2320.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of
flood control ... [t]he difference to petitioner ... is the loss of her
ability to exclude others.... [T]his right to exclude others is 'one of
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property."1 3 7 The majority did not find a satisfactory
connection between the public rambling through the Dolans' flood-
plain on a bike path and Tigard's desire to reduce flooding along
Fanno Creek.138 Additionally, the majority held Tigard had failed to
offer any proof of the need for such a dedication. 39
As for the bike pathway, the majority agreed with the city's find-
ings that the larger store the Dolans planned to build would increase
traffic on the streets surrounding the store.140 But the majority held
Tigard did not prove that the increased traffic created by the Dolans'
new store was reasonably related to its requirement that the Dolans
give it part of their land for the construction of the bike path.' 4 In a
mere difference of semantics, Tigard declared the bike path "could"
reduce the amount of traffic, not that the pathway "would" reduce
some of the traffic.'42 The majority emphasized again that no precise
formula is required. 43 However, the city needed to bolster its find-
ings in support of the bicycle pathway dedication beyond merely stat-
ing that some of the traffic "could" be alleviated. 14 Thus, the Court
commended the city's goals as "laudable", but stated that "there are
outer limits to how this may be done."' 45
VII. THE DIsspNTs
The decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard was five to four. Justice
Stevens wrote a detailed dissent in which Justices Blackmun and Gins-
burg joined. Justice Souter filed his own separate dissent. Justice Ste-
vens opposed the majority opinion and insisted upon reading his
dissenting opinion."4 As most Supreme Court decisions are not read
from the bench, Stevens' actions underscore the importance of this
137. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 167, 176 (1979)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2320-21.
140. Id. at 2321.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2321-22.
143. Id at 2322.
144. Id.
145. Id
146. Michael Berger, Not Always Right to Try to Get As Much As You Can, LAND USE L. &
ZoNwNG Di., July 1994, at 4.
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decision.147 Justice Stevens began by criticizing the majority's use of
state court decisions. Stevens was correct in his assertion that none of
the state cases cited by the majority utilized the rough proportionality
standard." However, the majority did not consult the state courts for
their application or opinion on the "rough proportionality" test.
Rather, the majority had a very narrow focus in its use of the state
court decisions. The majority consulted the state court decisions only
to help determine what the proper relationship should be between the
city's permit condition and the projected impact of petitioner's pro-
posed development.
Stevens next attacked the Court's narrow focus on one strand in
the property owner's bundle of rights: the power to exclude. Stevens
asserted that restricting one's right to exclude others "[does] not alone
constitute a taking, and [does] not do so in any event unless they un-
reasonably impair the value or use of the property."'1 49 As the major-
ity pointed out, however, Tigard desired more than to merely restrict
the Dolans' right to exclude. The city wanted to eradicate the Dolans'
right to exclude others by demanding an easement across the Dolans'
property. 50 Thus, the Dolans would lose their rights to regulate the
time and manner in which the public entered their property.151
147. 1&
148. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2323 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens is also correct in a number of
other assertions involving the state court decisions used by the majority. He is correct in assert-
ing that "[i]n o ly one case upholding a land use regulation did the losing property owner peti-
tion the Court for certiorari" and only four of the twelve opinions mention the Federal
Constitution. Id. Stevens correctly asserts that "it is quite obvious that neither the courts nor
the litigants imagined they might be participating in the development of a new rule of federal
law." Id. Additionally, Stevens is correct in asserting that the state court decisions are "willing
[t]o consider what the property owner gains from the exchange in question." Id. at 2324. Like-
wise, Stevens correctly asserts that the state courts required that the entire parcel be given con-
trolling effect and "the courts uniformly examined the character of the entire economic
transaction." Id. And "Inione of the decisions identified the surrender of the fee owner's power
to exclude as having any special significance." Id.
The majority was not looking at the state court decisions to answer the questions or points
asserted by Justice Stevens. The majority was merely consulting state court decisions to deter-
mine the necessary relationship between the dedication and the needs created by the develop-
ment. With that narrow focus in mind, the majority held that "[d]espite any semantical
differences, general agreement exists among the courts 'that the dedication should have some
reasonable relationship to the needs created by the development."' Id. at 2319 (quoting Call v.
West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1929) (alteration in original). Thus the state court deci-
sions adequately provided an answer to the narrow question that was posed by the majority.
149. Id. at 2325 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 83 (1980)).
150. Id. at 2321.
151. Id.
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Hence, "[h]er right to exclude would not be regulated, it would be
eviscerated."'1 52
Additionally, Stevens claimed the burden of proof should not be
shifted to the city, particularly because development exactions have
traditionally enjoyed a presumption of being constitutional. 153 The
majority countered by stating if a city calls its exaction or proposal a
"business regulation," it can still be challenged if it violates the Con-
stitution. 154 The Court had previously struck down other statutes vio-
lating other provisions of the Bill of Rights. 55 The Court then gave
the Takings Clause added stature by declaring: "[w]e see no reason
why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of
the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment,
should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these compara-
ble circumstances.' 56 Further, the majority agreed one challenging a
zoning regulation bears the burden of proving "that it constitutes an
arbitrary regulation of property.' 5 7  As the majority pointed out,
however, in this situation the city bore the burden because they did
not want to regulate land, rather they demanded that the Dolans give
it part of their land as a condition of using the rest.' 58
Stevens accused the Court of making "a serious error by aban-
doning the traditional presumption of constitutionality and imposing a
novel burden of proof' on land use planners.' 59 Under this new ap-
proach, the Court abandoned its traditional presumptions and held
that it is the city who must now prove each individual condition it
seeks from the developer is constitutional and meets the new "propor-
tionality requirement" as set out in the majority opinion.' 60 In Ste-
vens' view, uncertainty dominates the determinations about the
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2325 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2320.
155. Id. The Court has "held that a statute authorizing a warrantless search of business
premises in order to detect OSHA violations violated the Fourth Amendment." Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). Additionally, the Court also "held that an order of the New
York Public Service Commission, designed to cut down the use of electricity because of a fuel
shortage, violated the First Amendment insofar as it prohibited advertising by a utility company
to promote the use of electricity." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
156. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
157. Id. at 2320 n.8.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2323. This "individualized determination" is "[i]n addition to [first]
showing a rational nexus to a public purpose that would justify an outright denial of the permit."
"[T]he city must also demonstrate 'rough proportionality' between the harm caused by the new
land use and the benefit obtained by the condition." Id.
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effects of development projects on the environment. 161 "When there
is doubt concerning the magnitude of those impacts, the public inter-
est... must outweigh the private interest of the commercial entrepre-
neur." 162
Justice Souter dissented separately. Souter stated that Dolan was
not the appropriate case to take the law beyond the point of Nollan. 63
Souter stated this case required the same inquiry that Nollan did, and
that the Court needed to evaluate whether there was a reasonable
relationship between Tigard's land dedication requirements and the
city's legitimate desire to combat the negative impacts the Dolan's de-
velopment would create.' 64 Souter stated if the conditions failed to
pass under the Nollan test, "it is not because of [a] lack of proportion-
ality between [the] permit condition[s] and adverse effects. [It is] be-
cause of a lack of any rational connection at all between exaction of a
public recreational area and the governmental interest in providing
for the effect of increased [storm]water runoff. That is merely an ap-
plication of Nollan's nexus analysis."'165
VIII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DoLAN Decision
The impact of the Dolan decision will become clearer as more
and more cases are decided using the "rough proportionality" test.
Because the Court did not provide a takings formula that has mathe-
matical precision, future takings issues will be decided on a case by
case basis. The Dolan decision will have far reaching effects on how
municipalities impose conditions on development approvals. Because
the standard of "rough proportionality" is a new rule of law, it must
be applied in all states to conditional approvals of development, re-
gardless of the state's determination of what degree of proportionality
is required between the conditions demanded by the city and the pro-
posed impacts of the development. 66 Already a California court has
161. Id at 2329 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally, Stevens suggested that "if the government
can demonstrate that the conditions it has imposed in a land-use permit are rational, impartial
and conducive to fulfilling the aims of a valid land-use plan, a strong presumption of validity
should attach to those conditions. The burden of demonstrating that those conditions have un-
reasonably impaired the economic value of the proposed improvement belongs squarely on the
shoulders of the party challenging the state action's constitutionality." Id. at 2329-30. (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
163. Id at 2331 (Souter, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 2330 (Souter, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
166. Terry D. Morgan, Exactions as Takings Tactics for Dealing with Dolan, LAND Us- L. &
ZONING DIG., September 1994, at 3, 5.
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reconsidered a decision which upheld a condition that a condominium
developer pay close to $300,000 for public recreation and some
$40,000 more for public art, based on the holding of Dolan.167
Some things, however, are clear from the decision. Municipalities
must now impose exactions which are designed to address and allevi-
ate the problems or concerns created by the proposed development.
Further, these exactions must be proportional. A municipality can no
longer demand too much from a developer and hope to get away with
it. Municipalities will now have to re-examine their statutory proce-
dure to make sure they are in line with the new procedure as set out in
the Dolan decision. 68 Municipalities may be faced with more devel-
opers who will challenge an exaction they feel is overly burden-
some.169 Faced with the cost of litigation or, in the alternative,
providing the exacted condition themselves, municipalities may aban-
don worthwhile projects.
By assigning the burden of proof to cities in "adjudicative deci-
sions involving development exactions," the Court's decision creates
many questions. 171 How far must a city go to satisfy its burden of
proof? 72  Based upon the Dolan decision, there now needs to be
some minimal attempt by the municipality to establish the condition
imposed by it will address the impacts the development will create. 173
Thus, it will be to the city's advantage to make their case outside of a
courtroom and in a "quasi-judicial proceeding."'7 4 In order to avoid
the fate of Tigard, many municipalities may impose the condition they
feel is the least burdensome, or one which the developer will most
likely agree to.175
IX. CONCLUSION
The Dolan decision will have a profound impact on land-use
planning in many municipalities throughout the country. It imposes
greater discipline on government decisions affecting private property
and signifies significant upgrading in the status of property rights. The
167. Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1994).
168. Terry D. Morgan, Exactions as Takings Tactics for Dealing with Dolan, LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG., September 1994, at 3, 5.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id.
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Dolan decision will foster more sophisticated land-use planning when
a municipality is imposing exaction as conditions for development ap-
proval. How communities will deal with the Dolan new takings stan-
dard in their planning and regulatory efforts promises to be as
intriguing as how state and federal courts apply the standard in what is
likely to be an increasing number of land use cases.
Linas Grikis
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